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Footnotes Aren’t Enough: 
The Impact of Pension Accounting on Stock Values 
 
 
About two-thirds of large US companies provide employees with a traditional defined 
benefit (DB) pension which pays retiree benefits in the form of a life annuity.  These annuities 
are financed by corporate contributions to a separately-managed pension fund invested under the 
aegis of the plan sponsor.  By law, the sponsoring corporation is required to have enough assets 
on hand to fund, or pay for, all accrued vested benefits, even if the parent company were to go 
out of business.  Yet there is flexibility in the funding rules, and it is often difficult to assess the 
current health of a corporate pension fund. Determining the plan’s funded status requires 
knowledge of the present discounted value of future benefit flows and the market value of 
pension assets, yet pension fund finances are reported under rather arcane accounting 
conventions (McGill et al., 1996).  In particular, current accounting and actuarial practice 
permits smoothing of changes in the values of pension assets and liabilities, making it difficult 
for investors to readily ascertain the current funded status of a DB plan.  
If defined benefit pension accounting is, in fact, “opaque”, this can make it difficult to 
properly value firms that sponsor DB plans (Gold, 2005).  While the market values of pension 
assets and liabilities are disclosed in the footnotes to annual financial statements, considerable 
expertise may be required to evaluate the value-relevance of the pension-related accruals 
embedded in the income statement. For instance, in the latter half of the 1990s, many corporate 
DB plans became significantly overfunded and the earnings on pension fund investments 
significantly boosted the reported profitability of the sponsoring corporations.  Some market 
analysts argued that this produced a misleading picture of the sponsors’ core business 
 2
performance.  Then between 2000 and 2002, when the stock market plunged, interest rates fell, 
and the net position of most DB plans took a 180-degree turn.  The effects on the sponsor 
financial statements – particularly their profitability – showed up only with a substantial lag.   
This paper evaluates whether investors can see through the financial statement, so as to 
value corporate sponsor DB pension funding status based on economic values of pension assets 
and obligations.  In particular, we test the transparent view of pension valuation, against a 
specific alternative hypotheses in which firm equity value instead naively reflects the pension 
accruals located on the income statement, and thus fails to accurately reflect the economic value 
of net pension assets.  In doing so, we extend the work of Coronado and Sharpe (2003) to a 
period when the distortions to accounting statements were glaring enough to capture the attention 
of many market analysts and policymakers, and we assess whether increased scrutiny has 
brought about more accurate pension valuation.  Our results thus allow us to comment on the 
likely impact of new Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) statements seeking to 
incorporate more value-relevant information on current pension values in financial statements.   
Despite huge swings in pension valuations and heightened attention devoted to pension 
funding, we show that equity prices of firms sponsoring DB plans still fail to reflect the true 
economic value of pension assets and liabilities.  Instead, we conclude that firm valuations 
continue to be unduly influenced by the accruals reported in firm income statements, while 
placing little or no weight on the incremental information in the fair value of the net pension 
position reported in the footnotes to annual financial statements. The implication is that proposed 
changes to accounting standards will likely have an impact on the market values of pension 
sponsors. 
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1. Prior Analysis and Regulatory Trends 
An economic view of DB pension fund valuation takes the perspective of a consolidated 
corporate balance sheet. Here, pension assets and liabilities are assumed to be marked-to-market 
by investors, and thus contribute to firm value dollar-for-dollar (or somewhat less once tax 
effects are considered).1  During the late 1970s, the prevalence of underfunded DB plans spurred 
several empirical studies aimed at estimating the impact of DB pension plans on firm valuation. 
Many of these concluded that the market did, in fact, value net DB liabilities in a manner 
consistent with the consolidated balance sheet – in accordance with the “transparent” 
hypothesis.2   
Despite these findings, many market participants at the time suspected that the 
unfavorable financial position of most DB pensions was not fully reflected in share prices.  In 
particular, the financial community worried that the value of plan assets and liabilities was 
measured inconsistently across firms and inadequately disclosed, making it difficult for investors 
to accurately determine the impact of DB pensions on firm value.  Firms were required to 
disclose their net pension assets, but they were not required to do so within their financial 
statements.3  Indeed, the only manifestation of such plans on corporate financial statements was 
the annual cash contributions to these plans, which flowed through as an expense on the income 
statement. Furthermore, a variety of actuarial methods and assumptions were used to determine 
the market value of liabilities. 
To address these concerns, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB 1985) 
                                                 
1 Since these plans enjoy special tax treatment, net pension assets or liabilities should reflect after-tax dollars; and 
since the federal government partially insures these benefits, risky firms actually preserve a “put option” on the 
government suggesting that the pension liabilities will be valued less than dollar-for-dollar. See Black (1980), 
Feldstein and Seligman (1981), and Tepper (1981) for a discussion of taxes and Sharpe (1976) for an analysis of the 
impact of pension insurance.   
2 These papers include Feldstein and Seligman (1981), Feldstein and Morck (1983), and Bulow, Morck, and 
Summers (1987). 
3 See McGill, et al. (1996) for a more complete description of the evolution of pension accounting. 
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issued Statement Number 87, Employers’ Accounting for Pensions, stipulating a new accounting 
approach to be employed in fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1986.  Broadly speaking, 
FAS 87 standardized actuarial assumptions for valuing pension liabilities and set forth a new 
method for measuring pension expense on the income statements of sponsoring firms.  Rather 
than booking the actual cash contributions, companies now had to calculate pension expense 
using a complicated accrual methodology in which the cost of new benefits are offset by an 
expectation of average long-run returns on pension assets.  These guidelines also required 
disclosure of the fair market value of pension assets and liabilities within the footnotes to the 
annual financial statements, although the plan’s current funding position was still not reflected 
on the corporate balance sheet.4 
The FAS 87 efforts to boost standardization and improve measurement and disclosure of 
pension finances on company statements were positive steps, but increasingly they too have 
come under fire.  Analysts are concerned about the potential for conflicting signals from the 
income statement accruals and marked-to-market pension balance sheet information that FAS 87 
has required firms to disclose in footnotes to their annual reports.  Critics of pension accounting 
conventions expressed alarm that the serious funding shortfalls for many DB plans which 
resulted from the stock market bust at the beginning of the decade are not fully reflected in 
company financial statements.  For instance, Zion and Carcache’s (2002) work shows that 
pension costs reflected in company income statements are a lagging indicator of a pension plan’s 
true funding status.  Moreover, the financial community has been particularly vocal about its 
concerns.  As an example, Standard and Poor’s introduced a “core earnings” concept which 
gauges corporate operating earnings after stripping out some of the components of the pension 
                                                 
4 While many of the general principles for setting actuarial assumptions used in the accounting calculations are 
similar in spirit to those used in DB funding calculations required under ERISA, they are not explicitly linked.  
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accruals as well as other items (Blitzer, et al., 2001). Several Wall Street firms and prominent 
investment gurus including Warren Buffet have also called for a fundamental revision to the way 
pension costs are measured.  
Responding to the growing concern over the lack of transparency embedded in FAS 87, 
the FASB (2003) has continued to reevaluate and revise pension accounting.  One set of changes, 
implemented for financial statements ending after December 15, 2006, required pension sponsors 
to mark their pension assets and liabilities to market on corporate balance sheets as opposed to 
using actuarially smoothed values. The second phase, which is to review and revise the measures 
of pension cost reflected on the income statement, is expected to take two to three additional 
years to complete and implement. 
 
2. Pension Accounting and Value Relevancy 
The measure of pension expense reflected in the income statement under the FAS 87 
guidelines, net periodic pension cost (NPPC), is calculated as the annual accrued costs of the 
pension plan minus the expected return on plan assets.  As shown in Table 1, two key cost 
components of the NPPC are service cost and interest cost.  Other costs include amortization of 
previous gains and losses, amortization of prior service cost, and finally some ad hoc items such 
as charges for plan amendments and changes in actuarial assumptions.  The service cost is equal 
to the present value of the pension benefits earned by employees during the year, in essence, the 
cost of deferred compensation.  The interest cost is calculated as the beginning-of-year value of 
pension obligations multiplied by the plan’s assumed discount rate; this represents the cost of 
financing the outstanding pension obligation, that is, the increase in the benefit obligation 
resulting from the passage of time.  Under FAS 87 guidelines, the assumed discount rate must 
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reflect the rate at which current liabilities could be settled.  As a matter of practice, firms often 
use the Moody’s AA rate.   
Table 1 here 
The offset to plan costs in the NPPC is the expected return on plan assets, which is 
calculated as the product of two items: (i) the plan’s assumed long-run rate of return, and (ii) the 
accounting value, or “market-related value”, of the plan’s assets.  The market-related value can 
be either the fair market value of assets, or a systematically smoothed accounting value whereby 
unexpected returns are amortized over a period not exceeding five years.  Thus, for firms that 
choose the maximum amortization period – a majority of firms according to Zion and Carcache 
(2002) – the market-related value would be similar to a five-year moving average of the true 
market value.  Thus, the expected return component of the NPPC in many cases will reflect the 
actual market value of pension assets only with a substantial lag.5  
The key assumption for calculating the expected returns component is the assumed long-
run rate of return on plan assets, which is generally different from the discount rate used to 
calculate the present value of liabilities and the current year’s interest cost.  In choosing the long-
run return assumption, FAS 87 guidelines require the firm to consider the return currently being 
earned on plan assets and rates of return expected in the future.  Thus, for accounting purposes, 
the firm is explicitly directed to use an expected rate of return without regard to the riskiness of 
the underlying portfolio.6 
Gold (2005) argued that FAS 87 formalizes a systemic financial bias in pension 
accounting favoring equity investments.  This is because the volatility of actual returns on 
                                                 
5 In addition, changes in liabilities that result from interest rate movements are smoothed into the corporate income 
statement through the “other cost” component of the NPPC over a number of years.   
6Most of our sample period is characterized by low long-term interest rates relative to expected equity returns. 
Indeed, the average assumed long-run rate of return in our sample was around 9 percent, while the average discount 
rate was closer to 7 percent.  
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pension plan assets does not show through on the sponsor's financial statements, while the 
assumed expected return on the plan’s portfolio is not adjusted for risk.  In choosing the plan’s 
expected long-run rate of return on pension assets, firms anticipate or assume an equity premium.  
At the same time, because of the smoothing built into net pension cost from using expected 
returns with amortization, little of the volatility that gives rise to the equity premium shows up 
on the sponsoring firm’s financial statements.  Rather, the underlying income volatility (as well 
as the effective boost to leverage) is revealed only through the disclosure of marked-to-market 
values for pension assets and obligations in the footnotes to the annual reports. 
As a result of this smoothing, it seems plausible that the consolidated balance sheet 
model – or the “transparent model” – of pension valuation assumed in many analyses may not be 
accurate.  Instead, investors might utilize valuation techniques that rely on earnings and forecasts 
of earnings, which embed the stream of pension expenses reported on the income statement, 
while ignoring the marked-to-market value of net pension assets reported in the footnotes.  
Because the information presented on the income statement contains a downward-biased 
measure of risk-adjusted pension expense, the opaque model – which assumes investors use 
information on the financial statements but not in the footnotes – implies that the market will 
overprice firms that sponsor DB pension plans.7   
To test the transparent model of valuation we divide the net pension expense (NPPC) into 
two components, labeled service costs and financing accruals, as shown at the bottom of Table 
1.  Service cost is the component that measures deferred compensation accrued over the year, 
which we consider to be a “core” labor expense of the business.  The second piece, financing 
                                                 
7The discrepancy between the assumed rate of return and the discount rate generates a flow of income out of the 
pension plan operations and onto the income statement of the sponsoring firm. To see this, consider a plan that starts 
the period fully funded, that is, where the value of assets exactly equals the value of liabilities. The expected return 
on plan assets, calculated by multiplying the value of plan assets by the assumed return, will more than offset the 
growth in liabilities, or the interest cost, calculated as the product of the discount rate and the plan’s liability.  
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accruals, contains everything else; however, aside from amortizations of previous plan 
amendments (which recognizes changes in plan benefits over the term of employees’ years of 
service), this second component represents accruals related to the pension asset/liability 
management business, unrelated to the sponsoring firm’s core business.  In general, current 
earnings (or costs) due to this non-operating component of total earnings should not afford the 
same value multiple as the firm’s core operating earnings.  
Figure 1 shows the annual flow of the financing accruals component, summed over our 
sample US firms with DB plans (left scale), alongside the marked-to-market value of DB plan 
net assets for these firms (right scale)   Again, the accrual flows are embedded in the income 
statements while the net assets are merely disclosed in the footnotes.  Beginning around 2001, 
the two measures give rather contradictory signals about the impact of the DB plan on the value 
of the sponsors' equity.  When the stock market tumbled beginning in 2000, what had been a 
large aggregate net pension asset became a net liability that persisted through 2005.  By contrast, 
net pension accruals remained a sizable positive through 2002, only turning slightly negative in 
2005.  If investors were capitalizing, either implicitly or explicitly, the financing accruals in the 
income statement, rather than explicitly using the value of net pension assets reported in the 
footnotes, market equity values would not reflect the fair market value of the firm’s DB plan. 
Figure 1 here 
In previous work, Coronado and Sharpe (2003) have explored whether investors valued 
sponsors’ DB pension exposures based on the fair market value of pension assets and obligations 
disclosed in footnotes or based upon pension financing accruals in their accounting earnings. 
That analysis focused on S&P 500 firms over the years 1993-2001.  They found that, although 
accounting expenses (or earnings) associated with pension plans could be a misleading measure 
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of the underlying value of net pension obligations, the market seemed to focus on and price these 
accruals, rather than the pension balance sheet information revealed in the footnotes.  Moreover, 
the valuation that the market placed on the pension-related accruals was indistinguishable from 
that placed on sponsors’ core earnings.  This implied that the stock prices of S&P500 companies 
providing DB pension plans were generally misvalued over that period. 
More recently, other authors have asked how pension accounting or pension shortfalls 
influence corporate valuation. For instance, Picconi (2006) examines how firms use pension 
assumptions to manipulate earnings and concludes that greater accounting clarity would help 
investors in the valuation process. Hann, Heflin, and Subramanyam (2006) find that the opaque 
approach to pension accounting embodied in FAS 87 is less value-relevant for bond investors 
than the transparent approach.  Franzoni and Marin (2005) find that the stocks of firms with 
substantially underfunded pension plans earn negative abnormal returns over the next few years, 
suggesting that equity investors historically have shown a tendency to overvalue firms with 
underfunded pension plans.  On the other hand, Jin et al. (2004) report that DB pension 
underfunding seems to be appropriately reflected in stock return volatility.  In sum, controversy 
remains as to whether investors are fully aware of DB pension underfunding problems, and 
whether further transparency would benefit investors.8  In the next section we evaluate these 
questions directly. 
 
3. Recent and Prospective Accounting Reform 
Responding to the perception that DB plan pension accounting has been seriously 
deficient, the FASB is now reconsidering pension accounting standards as part of a broader 
                                                 
8 There is some evidence that the change in methodology at the major rating agencies which now score unfunded 
pension liabilities as general obligation corporate debt, has been effective in bond markets, as bond prices now seem 
to appropriately reflect the parent firm’s unfunded pension liabilities (Cardinale, 2005). 
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effort to adopt more transparent, marked-to-market accounting standards across the board.  To 
this end, in 2006, the FASB recommended that the pension accounting project proceed in two 
phases.  Phase One resulted in Statement 158 and eliminated all smoothing of actuarial gains and 
losses in the funding position beginning in fiscal years ending after December 15, 2006.  
Expense calculations were not revised, and so reconciling entries were added to the “other 
comprehensive income” section of shareholder’s equity.  Phase Two, expected to take several 
years, will completely re-evaluate pension accounting including the expense calculations 
reported in the income statement.  Given the FASB’s goal of harmonizing US with international 
accounting standards, it is likely that FASB will aim to produce an accounting standard similar to 
the one used by the UK and continental Europe, where the only effect of the pension fund on the 
income statement results from the inclusion of service cost.  Any other changes to the value of 
assets and liabilities that occur from market changes must be reflected on a marked-to-market 
basis on the balance sheet. 
 These two phases of the FASB’s accounting reform will eventually result in the 
migration of key information from the footnotes to the balance sheet. They might also cause the 
removal of pension-related accruals from the main body of the income statement.  Previous 
studies would suggest that this change in accounting will influence how the market values stocks 
of firms sponsoring DB pensions.  Alternatively, the intense focus on pension accounting since 
2000 and the widespread practice of plan underfunding may have already focused investors’ 
attention on the issue sufficiently. In this case, investors may have been valuing pensions more 
accurately for some time and the new reporting standards will have little effect.  Next we turn to 
an empirical analysis that should determine which of these outcomes is more likely.  
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4. Empirical Results: Have Financial Markets Caught On? 
 
To evaluate these alternative views, we employ the empirical valuation framework 
advanced by Feltham and Ohlson (1995), which is a parsimonious application of the residual 
income model.  In the model, firm equity value (P), is expressed as the sum of the value 
emanating from the firm’s nonfinancial operating activities plus the value of unrelated financial 
activities.  Our application of this model divides both the balance sheet and the income statement 
of the firm into components measuring the results from either (i) core operations or (ii) pension 
plan asset/liability management.     
In particular, we measure core book equity value (BVC) as total book equity value minus 
the book value of net pension assets, where the latter is defined in Compustat as prepaid pension 
cost (or minus accrued pension costs).  Earnings from core operations (CoreEPS) is defined as 
total expected earnings minus pension earnings (EPS − PensionEPS), where pension EPS 
represents net financing accruals defined in Table 1 (net periodic pension cost minus service 
cost).  Thus, the accrual of new pension obligations from current labor services (the service cost) 
is the only piece of pension cost treated as a core expense.  Finally, the market value of pension 
assets minus the projected benefit obligation (PBO), which we call net pension assets, is denoted 
by NPA.  Using this notation, we thus propose the following multivariate regression model:  
tttttt uPensionEPSbNPAbCoreEPSbBVCbbP +++++= 43210       (1) 
The transparent valuation model implies 0.65 < b3  <1 and b4 = 0; that is, investors simply 
focus on the value of net pension assets rather than the associated flow of net financing accruals.9  
The polar alternative, the opaque view of pension valuation, holds that investors value the stream 
of pension financing accruals reported in the income statement, that is, b3 = 0 and b4  > 0.    
                                                 
9 A coefficient of 0.65 would imply valuation on an after-tax basis, where 0.65 is approximately equal to one minus 
the marginal tax rate faced by the corporate sponsor. 
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In implementing this simple model, we introduce some minor modifications.  First, to 
remove the time trend in the variables and the associated heteroskedasticity, all variables in (4) 
are normalized by assets (per share).  Second, we control for more general earnings trajectories 
by adding a measure of analyst growth expectations (Growth Forecast).  Finally, we include a 
Pension Indicator, a dummy variable that indicates whether the firm has a DB pension plan. 
The two principal sources of data for our analysis are Compustat, for historical financial 
information including items related to company defined benefit pension plans, and I/B/E/S 
International, for stock prices and analyst earnings forecasts.  We focus on firms included in the 
S&P 500 over the period 1993-2005.  This yields a total of 7,290 firm-year observations; about 
two-thirds of these have DB plans.  We begin our analysis in 1993 because many pension 
variables are unavailable in Compustat prior to that time. In addition, 1993-2005 is a particularly 
interesting period as it covers the boom, bust, and subsequent recovery of the equity market. 
Estimation results appear in Table 2, with columns (1)-(4) covering what we call the 
1993-2001 “pre-conscious” period, and columns (5)-(8) showing the analogous estimates for the 
more recent period, 2002-2005.  During the latter period, we would expect investors to have paid 
particularly close attention to the value-relevance of DB pension plans, due to the dramatic 
swing from over- to under-funding of DB plans from 2000-2002 and the consequent public 
attention on accounting distortions.  All regressions include semiannual time controls and, except 
when noted, a set of broad industry dummies.10  In each case, regressions are estimated using 
robust regression, which mutes the influence of outliers.    
Table 2 here 
We begin by testing the transparent view of pension valuation against the simple 
alternative that the firm’s equity value fails to accurately reflect the value of net pension assets.  
                                                 
10 The data appendix at the end of the paper describes the sample in more detail.   
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As argued above, under the transparent view, the market value of the firm will fully reflect the 
value of net pension assets (or net liabilities) reported in the footnotes to the 10-K; for instance, 
the coefficient on Pension NAV in equation (1) should be between 0.65 and 1. Column (1) 
controls for the value of core operations, reflected in core book value and expected core earnings 
(Core EPS); but it excludes Pension EPS, the component of expected earnings associated with 
pension accruals.  For the initial period we examine, the coefficient estimated on Pension NAV 
is 0.93, which is highly significant and not significantly different from one, suggesting that the 
market did accurately price corporate pension assets and liabilities.   
At the same time, core earnings were priced with a coefficient of 15.74, implying that 
each dollar of expected core earnings added over 15 dollars to market price.  As we would 
expect, core book value had a positive marginal effect (0.28) on market equity value.  A higher 
analyst growth forecast also had a positive effect on the market value of equity: in particular, a 
10 percentage point increase in expected long-term growth added three percentage points to the 
ratio of market equity value to book asset value.  Finally, the coefficient on the pension indicator 
indicates that, all else equal, firms with DB plans had slightly higher market values on average 
(relative to assets), perhaps because the presence of a defined benefit plan was correlated with 
omitted firm characteristics such as firm age. 
A more demanding test involves putting the transparent view up against a specific 
alternative, the opaque view, which presumes that the market instead values the pension 
financing accruals (expected return and interest cost) booked in accordance with FAS 87.  In this 
test, we include Pension EPS as an additional regressor.  One concern in running this test is that 
Pension EPS and Pension NAV might be highly correlated.  Figure 1 demonstrated the  
disconnect between these two measures in the aggregate time series.  Figure 2 graphs the cross-
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sectional correlation of the two measures by year.  Clearly the two are not always closely related, 
so the test should be econometrically sound.  The early-period estimates of this specification are 
shown in Column (2) where the transparent view is now strongly rejected: the coefficient on 
Pension NAV drops to 0.05, while the coefficient on Pension EPS is 13.89.  Moreover, we 
cannot reject the restriction that the market valued pension accruals no differently than core 
earnings.11  
The central question of this paper concerns whether the market correctly focused on the 
disclosed value of pension assets and liabilities after the huge stock market and interest rate 
swings around the turn of the decade, when market strategists and regulators focused attention on 
the shortcomings of pension accounting standards.  The answer is given by Columns (5) and (6), 
where we have estimated the same models on the data for 2002-05.  Surprisingly, here we reject 
the transparent view even using the less stringent test against the general alternative.  The 
coefficient on Pension NAV in (5) is very small and insignificant.  In the more stringent test, this 
coefficient even becomes negative though not statistically significant, while the coefficient on 
Pension EPS is 19.08, larger than that on Core EPS.12  The other coefficients are mostly similar 
to those for the early period, though Pension Indicator is only marginally significant. 
To test the robustness of these results, we re-estimate the valuation model using fixed 
effects, which focuses the analysis on explaining within-firm valuation differences across time.  
The advantage of such an approach is that it removes potential omitted variable biases; the 
disadvantage is that it requires our measures of expected earnings and pension value to be timely 
                                                 
11 Viewed together, the results in columns (1) and (2) also provide a rationale for why our conclusions might differ 
from those of Jin et al. (2006).   That study concluded that the market prices the pension plan risk correctly but this 
result is based on a test against a relatively weaker alternative hypothesis, similar to the test in column (1).  If tested 
against a specific alternative, analogous to column (2), their conclusions might be reversed. 
12 When Pension NAV is dropped from the regression, this coefficient drops to 18.3, which is not significantly 
different from that on core earnings. 
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measures of the variables the market is focusing on at the time the stock price is measured.13  As 
shown in Column (3), the results are basically unchanged for the early period, though the 
coefficient on core earnings is a bit lower.  For the later period, reported in Column (7), it again 
appears that the market prices pension accruals rather than pension NAV, though here the 
coefficient on pension accruals is significantly lower than the coefficient on core EPS. 
Our final test provides ancillary support for our interpretation.  We have argued that 
Pension EPS is a poor measure of the plan sponsor’s true pension position (and cost) because 
smoothing delays the impact of recent plan performance on expense/earnings; in effect, Pension 
EPS reflects a three-to-five-year moving average of the plan’s condition.  If so, then lagged 
values of Pension NAV might have incremental explanatory power for sponsors’ current stock 
price: the market prices stale information.  We test this by adding to the first specification, from 
Columns (1) and (5), the twice-lagged value of Pension NAV, that is, the value from two years 
prior to the measure already included.  Results appear in Columns (4) and (8). Consistent with 
our conjecture, the second lag comes in significantly.  This is particularly notable in the later 
period where the twice-lagged measure has a coefficient of 0.89 despite the finding that more 
current measure had no explanatory power in the original specification. 
 
5. Implied Valuation Errors 
We conclude that market participants are not pricing the fair market value of pension 
assets and liabilities but instead appear to value pension earnings no differently than operating 
earnings. As a result, some firms with DB plans could be substantially misvalued.  To get some 
bearing on the magnitude of the resulting valuation errors, we use a use a simple PE ratio model 
                                                 
13 To reduce this potential problem somewhat, we eliminated firms for which there were fewer than three 
observations. 
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of valuation, together with the assumption that Pension EPS is priced the same as Core EPS.  
Accordingly, we first estimate the value placed on each firm’s earnings in each year by 
estimating a model of the PE multiple, which includes time and broad industry dummies, firm 
size, and two key “fundamental” determinants of PEs, the dividend payout rate and expected 
earnings growth.  Regression results, together with standard errors, are: 
( ) ( ) ( )ln 0.17 ln 0.57 ln 0.015 lnt t t t
t
P div growth assets
EPS
⎛ ⎞
= ∗ + ∗ − ∗⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
    (2) 
      (0.02)      (0.02)    (0.005) 
 
where EPS is (total) expected current-year earnings per share, div represents the current dividend 
payout rate, growth refers to the analysts’ consensus long-term growth forecast, and assets is the 
total book value of firm assets, a proxy for firm size. 
Given our finding that investors do not distinguish between operating and pension 
earnings, one can estimate the market’s implicit value of the pension plan by multiplying the 
firm’s Price-Earnings multiple by the Pension EPS.  The resulting figure is an estimate of the 
incremental value to the firm’s equity attributable to the market's valuation of pension accruals.  
To construct estimates of the valuation errors (on the stocks of pension plan sponsors), we 
subtract the pension net asset value reported in the footnotes (the fair market value of pension 
assets minus the PBO).   Figure 3 shows the resulting distribution of firm valuation errors as a 
percent of firm market capitalization from 1993-2005.  Each vertical line represents the 10th to 
90th percentile range for each year, and the diamonds indicate the median valuation error.  Also 
shown are the weighted average valuation errors for each year, a measure of the aggregate 
impact on the market capitalization of S&P 500 firms with DB plans.   
Figure 3 here 
The results clearly indicate the impact of investors failing to distinguish between pension 
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accruals and net pension assets.  The rise in the top end of the distribution by 2000 and 2001 
illustrates the extent to which investors were overvaluing certain firms that continued to show 
large positive pension accruals during this period, even as their pension net asset values fell due 
to the market decline.  In fact, during this period, model estimates suggest that some firms were 
as much as 20 percent overvalued, even though the aggregate effect on our sample was a five 
percent valuation error.  Since 2002, firm valuation errors have fallen and become more evenly 
distributed around zero.  Indeed, in the last couple of years, some firms were apparently 
undervalued because their pension accruals were highly negative from the lagged effects of the 
earlier market decline, despite the rebound in the reported value of net pension assets. 
 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
There has long been an important disconnect between the financial impact of the pension 
plan implied by accounting accruals, and the information disclosed in the footnotes.  Despite 
much attention from the accounting profession and Wall Street, our results suggest that investors 
still do not correctly perceive how DB pension plans influence corporate valuation in the US 
marketplace. As a result, over the past decade, pension accruals embedded in the financial 
statements have been particularly poor stand-ins for pension value.  Indeed, pension accruals are 
potentially worse than noise, as there are times when they have been negatively correlated with 
the value of pension assets. 
While the valuation errors we estimate are not large in the aggregate, they can be fairly 
sizable for individual companies.  Since the disconnect between net asset values and pension 
accruals ought to error-correct over time, our results suggest that investors who do understand 
the oddities of pension accounting ought to be able craft a strategy to earn abnormal returns.  
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Indeed, Franzoni and Marin (2006a, 2006b) find that, over roughly the same period as the one 
we study, investors would have been earned excess returns over three-five year holding periods 
by shorting firms after they report large pension deficits in their footnotes.  This suggests that the 
second phase of FASB’s reform efforts may have important consequences for the market values 
of firms sponsoring DB pensions.
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Data Appendix 
 
The dataset used for this analysis includes all firms included in the S&P 500 over the 
period 1993-2005; that is, we included all years for any firms in the index at any point over that 
time span. The resulting sample includes 7,290 firm-years, or an average of 561 data points per 
year. Companies with DB plans comprise 71% of the sample; firms without DB pension plans 
are 29% of our sample (nonDB companies are flagged with an indicator (0,1) variable). Wharton 
Research Data Service (WRDS) made available to us the two data sources necessary, namely, 
Compustat for historical financial data, and I/B/E/S International for analyst forecasts and stock 
price data.    
Variables from Compustat included firm financial data from 1993-2005, including book 
equity values, total assets, pretax income, and several variables related to the financial position 
of DB pension plans. Compustat data were then merged with earnings forecasts and pricing data 
from I/B/E/S using firm CUSIP numbers. Variables taken from I/B/E/S included annual 
observations of share price, shares outstanding, dividends per share, consensus (mean) forecasts 
of earning per share for both the current and subsequent fiscal years, and the median analyst 
forecast for long-term growth. The timing of the data match is chosen such that the date of 
pricing and forecast data follows the date of the financials reported in each firm’s 10-K. This is 
intended to ensure that market and analyst forecasts incorporate reported financial data as of the 
measurement date. To do so, our sample is broken into two halves: firms with fiscal years ending 
in October through March are matched with price and forecast data from May of the subsequent 
year; and firms with fiscal years ending April through September are matched with price and 
forecast data from November of the same year.  
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Table 1.  Accounting Costs for DB Pension Plans 
 Item     Definition 
+     Service cost Present value of benefits earned this year 
+     Interest cost Interest cost on current benefit obligation  
+     Other costs 
Amortization of gains, losses and prior 
service cost 
Amendments, actuarial assumption changes 
−   Expected return on plan  assets Assumed return on market-related value R*MRV (5-yr smoothing of unexpected R) 
=    Net periodic pension cost (NPPC) On income statement 
      Service cost In “core EPS” 
      “Net financing accruals” Used for “Pension EPS” 
 
Source: Adapted from Coronado and Sharpe (2003). 
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Table 2.  Regressions of Stock Price on Key 
Pension Variables.     
   
 1993-2001  2002-2005 
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Core EPS 15.74 15.71 10.49 18.03  15.81 15.57 11.39 15.91 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12)  (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Pension EPS  13.89 13.72     19.08 7.61   
  (1.98) (1.81)     (2.22) (1.66)   
Pension NAV 0.93 0.05 -0.04 0.44  0.03 -0.29 0.13 -0.41 
 (0.10) (0.16) (0.15) (0.19)  (0.20) (0.20) (0.26) (0.22) 
Core Book Value 0.28 0.30 0.61 0.19  0.40 0.44 0.25 0.38 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
Growth Forecast 3.05 3.06 1.60 3.16  1.75 1.99 0.48 1.87 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.11)  (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.13) 
Pension Indicator  0.05 0.04  0.05  -0.03 -0.03  -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02) (0.18)  (0.02) 
Pension NAV, lag 2    0.54     0.89 
    (0.19)     (0.20) 
N (obs.) 5,275 5,275 5,274 3,925  2,015 2,015 1,951 1,977 
Root MSE 0.318 0.315 0.204 0.359  0.297 0.287 0.116 0.292 
Measure of fit (adj-R2) 0.933 0.934    0.922 0.925  0.924 
Notes: Dependent Variable is Market Equity value normalized by Book Assets.  All regressors except for the Growth Forecast and Pension Indicator are also 
normalized by Book Assets. Regressions also include time and broad industry controls. Standard errors appear below coefficient estimates.  
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
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Figure 1
Pension Net Asset Value versus Financing Accruals
($ billions)
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Source: Compustat and authors’ calculations; see the Data Appendix. 
 
Figure 2
Cross-Sectional Correlation of Pension EPS with NAV
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Source: Compustat and authors’ calculations; see the Data Appendix. 
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Figure 3
Valuation Errors: Annual Distribution
(as % of firm market capitalization)
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Source: Compustat, IBES, and authors’ calculations; see the Data Appendix. 
 
 
